Ous P. Lexes, Ralph M. Garner, Peter John Kanon and Thomas L. Anderson v. The Industrial Commission of Utah and American Smelting and Refining Company : Brief of Defendants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
Ous P. Lexes, Ralph M. Garner, Peter John Kanon
and Thomas L. Anderson v. The Industrial
Commission of Utah and American Smelting and
Refining Company : Brief of Defendants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Attorneys for Defendants; Clinton D. Vernon; Fred F. Dremann;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Lexes v. Industrial Comm. Of Utah, No. 7623 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1385
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GUS P. LEXES, RALPH M. GARNER, 
PETER JOHN K AN 0 N and 
THOMAS L. ANDERSON, Em-




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Department of Employ-
ment Security and AMERICAN 
SMELTING & REFINING COM-
PANY, 
Defendants 
Case No. 7623 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
f \ L ~,"'R.oRNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS: 
J.\?~ 2 \) __ ,CUHTON D. VERNON, 
--------------c~;;;, \lta9lttorney General 
.---(:\.~;~. supcew:ne FRED F. DREMANN, Special 
Assi.rtant Attorney General 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
Statement of Case ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 
Statement of Facts ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4 
Statement of Points ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS 
I. The Claimants Were Not Available for Work Within the 
Meaning of the Utah Employment Security Act and were 
Therefore Ineligible to Receive Unemployment Compensation 
Benefits for the Period Commencing June 25, 1950, and End-
ing July 8, 1950 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7 
II. The Petitioners Left Work Voluntarily Without Good Cause .. 24 
III. The Unemployment of the Claimants Was Not Due to the 
Employer's Fault ....................................................... ................. 2 5 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 
Bodinson Manufacturing Company vs. California Employment 
Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P. 2d 935, and 101 P. 2d 165 11 
American Brake Shoe Company vs. Frank Annunzio, Director of 
Labor, et al, 405 Ill. 44 -------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
Local Union No. 222, Oil Workers International Union, et al, vs. 
Robert L. Gordon, Director of Labor, et al, (Illinois Supreme 
Court May 18, 1950) 406 Ill. 145 ........ ---------------------------------------- 13 
Indiana Board of Review Decision No. 48-LDR-6, 4-18-49, quoted 
at C.C.H. paragraph 8163 ------------------------------------------------------------ 15 
Oregon Appeals Referee, Case No. 46-RA-144, March 9, 1946, 
quoted at C.C.H. P. 8059----------------------·------------------------------------- 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Carl W. Franke vs. Unemployment Compensa.tion Board of Review, 
166 Po. Super. 251, 70 A. 2d 461 (9950) ................................ 15 
Frank H. McGann vs. Unemployment Compensation Board of 
Review, 163 Pa. _Super. 379, 62 A. 2d 87 ................................ 16 
Joseph D. Pnilllps, vs. Unemployment Compensation Board of 
Review, 163 Pa. Super. 374, 62 A. 2d 84 ................................ 17 
Joseph P. Stillman, et al, vs. Unemployment Compensation Board 
of Review, 161 Pa. Super. 569, 56 A. 2d 380 ............................ 17 
Miller vs. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 152 Pa. 
Superior Ct. 315, 321, 31 A. 2d 740 ............................................ 18 
Employees of Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company, Washing-
ton Supreme Court (Case No. 30668), October 22, 1948, 31 
Wash. 659, 198 P. 2d 675 ............................................................ 18 
Phillip Meyer et al, vs. Industrial Commission of Missouri, et al, 
St. Louis Court of Appeals, October 18, 1949, CCH Mo. 8151.. .. 19 
Selected Decisions of the Umpire, 1943-1948, Case No. CUB-287, 
September 10, 1947 ...................................................................... 20 
Selected Decisions of the Umpire, 1943-1948, Case No. CUB-320, 
February 5, 1948 ........................................................................ 21 
Members of the Iron Workers of Provo, Utah,_ (Employees of 
Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company) vs. Industrial Corn-
mission of Utah, et al, 139 P. 2d 208 ........................................ 21 
In Re Persons Employed, etc., 7 Wash. 2d 580, 110 P. 2d 877 ........ 21 
Levinson vs. UCC Circuit Court, Jasper County, Missouri, No. 
47785-, December 14, 1942 ........................................................ 22 
Prince vs. Schick, Inc., Super. Ct., Fairfield County, Connecticut, 
No. 75665, August 27, 1948, C.C.H., U.I. Rep., Volume II, 
pp. 10, 583 ....................... : ................. : ......................................... 23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
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GUS P. LEXES, RALPH M. GARNER, 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Department of Employ-
ment Security and AMERICAN 
SMELTING & REFINING COM-
PANY, 
Defendants 
Case No. 7623 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On July 11, 1950, a representative of the Department 
of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
issued a decision holding the claimants in this matter to be 
ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits 
from June 25, 1950, through July 8, 1950. 
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On July 19, 1950, the Department received an appeal 
filed on behalf of the claimants. The appeal was referred to 
the Appeals Referee on July 21, 1950, and an appeal hearing 
was conducted on August 21, 1950. The Referee upheld the 
decision of the representative, and the matter was appealed 
to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission. The 
Board of Review, on the 5th day of December, 1950, issued a 
decision upholding the decision of the representative and the 
Referee. The matter is now before this court on a Petition 
for Review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to June 25, 1950, certain switching was being done 
on the premises of the American Smelting & Refining Com-
pany, Garfield, Utah, pursuant to a contract with the D & RGW 
Railroad. Under the contract railroad employees (members 
of the Switchmen's Union of North America) did the switch-
ing as employees of the D & RGW. 
On June 25, 1950, pursuant to a strike order, members 
of the Switchmen's Union of North America who were em-
ployed by the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad (in-
cluding those at the American Smelting & Refining Plant at 
Garfield, Utah) left their work (Tr. 32). 
The contract between Local Union No. 4347, United Steel 
Workers of America, C.I.O., and American Smelting & Re-
fining Company provided that the union would have juris-
diction over the jobs which were vacated by the striking 
switchmen (Tr. 49). Pursuant to the provisions of the con-
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tract, the company and. the union entered into arrangements 
whereby on June 26 (Tr. 48) members of Local Union No. 
4347 took over such switching work, using equipment fur-
nished by the American Smelting & Refining Company. At 
that time the contract wit.~ the D & RG\XT had been cancelled 
and there were no positions in the plant operations which 
were being filled by railroad employees. 
On June 28, 1950, the Switchmen's Union of North 
America established pickets at the gates of the plant. At that 
time, and immediately prior thereto, the company had been 
operating three shifts (Tr. 4), one shift commencing at 7:45 
a.m. (the morning shift) , the afternoon shift reporting at 3: 4 5 
p.m., and the evening shift reporting at 11 :45 p.m. When 
the morning shift reported for work on the morning of June 
28, 1950, it encountered the pickets of the Switchmen's Union. 
On the 23rd day of June, the Executive Board of Local 
Union 4347, United Steel Workers of America, C.I.O., met 
and discussed the company's proposal to take over the switch-
men's job in event the D & RGW workers left the plant. At 
that time the Board agreed that if there was a picket line 
established by the Switchmen's Union, the members of Local 
No. 4347 would not enter the plan·t (Tr. 17, 18). On or 
about the same time one of the officers of the Executive Board 
notified the management of the American Smelting & Refining 
Company that the members of Local Union No. 4347 would 
take over the switching operations formerly done by members 
of the Switchmen's Union, but that if a picket line was estab-
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The employees of the American Smelting & Refining Com-
pany, upon finding the pickets of the Switchmen's Union, 
stayed outside the plant (Tr. 19). A delegation of members 
of Local Union No. 4347 (representing (A.S. & R. employees) 
was sent into the plant to advise certain A.F. of L. union mem-
bers who were working on a construction project to get out 
and stay out during the existence of the picket lines (Tr. 20). 
At about 10:30 a.m., June 28, 1950, the union represen-
tatives met with the representatives of management and dis-
cussed the existence of the picket line (Tr. 36). At that time 
the union advised the management that the men were honoring 
the picket line and would not come through, and the union 
representatives suggested to the management that the after-
noon and night shifts be advised as to the situation and that 
the afternoon and night shift workers were not to report 
for work. Such a notice appeared on various radios that 
afternoon and evening (Tr. 36, 41). 
Members of Local Union No. 4347, United Steel Workers 
of America (employees of the A.S. & R. Company) worked 
with the pickets of the Switchmen's Union in order to point 
out which individuals were supervisory employees of the 
company and therefore entitled to go through the line (Tr. 44). 
The workmen on the afternoon and evening shifts did 
not report for work (Tr. 60). 
There was no dispute between the Switchmen's Union of 
North America and the American Smelting & Refining Com-
pany either prior to or at the time the Switchmen's Union 
established their picket line at the A.S. & R. property. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE CLAil\1ANTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE FOR 
WORK \"X!ITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH 
El\fPLOYl\1ENT SfCl TRITY ACT AND WERE THERE-
FORE INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR THE PERIOD COl\1-
MENCING JUNE 25, 1950, AND ENDING JULY 8, 
1950. 
II. THE PETITIONERS LEFT WORK VOLUNTARILY 
\XliTHOUT GOOD CAUSE. 
III. THE UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE CLAIMANTS WAS 
NOT DUE TO THE EMPLOYER'S FAULT. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE CLAIMANTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE FOR 
WORK WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH EM-
PLOYMENT SECURITY ACT AND WERE THEREFORE 
INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPEN-
SATION BENEFITS FOR THE PERIOD COMMENCING 
JUNE 25, 1950, AND ENDING JULY 8, 1950. 
The Utah Employment Security Act provides, Sec. 42-
2a-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943, that to be eligible to re-
ceive benefits with respect to any week a claimant must make 
a claim for benefits for that week, he must register for work, 
and he must be able and available for work. The word "avail-
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ability" is generally defined as· being at disposal, accessible, 
attainable, ready or handy, and usable. The claimant is con-
sidered to be available for work only when he is prepared to 
accept at once an offer of any suitable work brought to his 
notice. The question of availability usually arises in two types 
of situations; one where, by some overt act such as leaving 
his usual employment or leaving the general area where his 
type of employment is available or assuming obligations extra-
neous to employment or the like, the claimant has materially 
lessened his opportunity of working or has restricted his sphere 
of employment; and the other where the claimant has failed 
to apply for, or has refused to accept employment. In the 
situations of the first type the mental attitude and the inten-
tions of the claimant toward accepting suitable work are an 
important test even though he has placed himself in a position 
which, viewed objectively, would seem consistent with avail-
ability. The acceptance of his customary employment or any 
suitable work, of course, constitutes the best evidence of mental 
willingness to work. 
In the instant case there can be no contention that the 
usual work of the claimants at the American Smelting & 
Refining properties was not suitable. 
The petitioners call the court's attention to Section 42-
2a-5(c) (2), Utah Code Annotated 1943 (Utah Employment 
Security Act) which sets up certain standards applying to 
offers of new work. That section quoted by the petitioners 
provides that new work may not be offered to a claimant if 
the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, 
or other labor dispute. The primary· intent of this statutory 
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provision is to bar a referral of workers which would have 
the effect of setting up a system of strike breaking. 
In the instant case there was no offer of new work to any 
of the clair.1ants. The v;ork which was involved was their 
customary usual occupation. As early as June 23, 1950, the 
Executive Board of Local Union 4347, United Steel Workers 
of America, C.I.O., had determined that its members would 
not violate any picket line which might be established by the 
Switchmen's Union (Tr. 17, 18). They notified the manage-
ment on or about that time that if the picket line were estab-
lished they would not be available for work. On June 28 at 
the time the picket line was established the members of the 
Executive Board again notified the company that its members 
would not cross the picket line and that there would be no 
employees available to continue operations. 
The situation wherein a non-striking umon refuses to 
cross picket lines is not a novel one. The instant case differs 
from many others only by virtue of the fact that there was no 
strike and no dispute in existence between the Switchmen's 
Union of North America and the American Smelting & Refin-
ing Company. The strike and the dispute was between the 
S~,ritchmen's Union of North America and the Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company. The reason given by the 
claimants for failing to cross the picket lines is very well 
expressed by one of claimants' witnesses, who, when asked 
why union members respected picket lines, replied: 
"Well, every union man on joining a union pledges 
that he will work for the betterment of organized labor 
and that he will not under any circumstances take an-
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other man's job and that he will cease work on the 
orders of his union, and there is also a common belief 
among organized labor that what hurts one union man 
hurts another and to undermine the--for the C.I.O., 
for example, to undermine the A. F. of L. union by 
crossing their picket lines and aid in breaking the strike 
would undermine all of our rights." (Tr. 39). 
In essence, then, the honoring by one union of the picket 
lines of another union is an economic weapon which has been 
adopted by the entire union movement. This choice of action 
on the part of union members does not in any manner or means 
change the general purpose of unemployment compensation 
laws. These laws are established to accumulate funds by levying 
contributions against the employers or payrolls; said funds 
to be used for the payment of unemployment compensation to 
individuals who become unemployed through no fault of their 
own. Unemployment compensation is provided to carry indi-
viduals over temporary periods wherein they are unable to 
work because of factors beyond their control. The intent of 
employment security and unemployment compensation cannot 
be changed by reason of possible stigmas or union penalties 
which spring from and are inherent in the union movement 
and which are subject to change only by the unions themselves. 
To hold that the unions could establish rules under which 
unemployment compensation would be paid would necessarily 
mean that employers or employer groups could also establish 
rules under which unemployment compensation would be paid 
or denied as the case might be. . 
The right of the union as an organization or the individual 
member of the union to recognize picket lines or abide by other 
10 
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union rules must not be confused with the right of such indi-
viduals to unemployment compensation. Voluntary actions in 
many instances deny unemployment benefits to individual 
workers. They are denied benefits in cases of misconduct in 
connection with their work, in cases of voluntary quits, in cases 
where they are physically unable to work, and in many other 
instances v.rhere the underlying reason for their unemployment 
lies in some volitional act on their part. 
In Bodinson Manufacturing Company vs. California Em-
ployment Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P. 2d 935, and 
101 P. 2d 165, a strike was called by the welders union. The 
machinists did not go on strike but refused to cross the picket 
line of the welders. The Commission determined that the 
machinists were eligible for benefits. The court in holding that 
this determination was erroneous stated: 
"The weakness of this argument is not in the under-
lying premises upon which respondents rely, but in its 
application to the present case based upon the assump-
tion that the employees who refused to pass the picket 
line did not act of their own volition. It is true that 
under the proper construction of the statute an em-
ployee who is prevented from working through no act 
of his own is entitled to compensation, as for example, 
where he is barred by force from the premises where he 
has been working, but that is not the situation here. 
If the picket line was maintained within the limits 
permitted by law, as this one presumably was, no 
physical compulsion was exerted to prevent co-
respondents from working. They were unemployed 
solely because in accordance with their union principles 
they did not choose to work in a plant where certain 
of their fellow employees were on strike. Their own 
11 
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consciences and faith in their union principles dictated 
their action. This choice is one which members of or-
ganized labor are frequently called upon to make, and 
in the eyes of the law this kind of choice has never 
been deemed involuntary. This very point was con-
sideL"ed by us in a recent ca:e dealing with the right 
of labor unions to picket, wherein the employer sought 
an injunction on the ground that the picket line oper-
ated as an unlawful compulsion upon other union men. 
We said . . . 'It is obviously untrue that when truck 
drivers employed by other firms refuse to go through 
the picket line, they do so involuntarily. Such refusal 
is undobutedly based upon the freely adopted rules of 
the local union to which they belong.' Fairly inter-
preted it was intended to disqualify those workers who 
voluntarily leave their work because of a trade dispute. 
Co-respondents in this proceeding, 'in fact, left their 
work because of a trade dispute and are consequently 
ineligible to receive benefit payments." 
In the instant case the workers remained away from their 
employment solely because of their adherence to the union 
principle of honoring picket lines. The defendants do not 
question the union principles involved. We do, however, con-
tend that benefits are not payable to claimants whose unem-
ployment is due directly to their voluntarily staying away 
from work due to the carrying out of those, principles. We 
think it makes little difference whether the picket line is a legal 
one or one which constitutes a secondary boycott. In the in-
stant case, the union to which the claimants belonged not only 
recognized the picket line, but took an active part in enforcing 
the picket line by sending a delegation into the plant to order 
certain A. F. of L. construction workers off the property. In 
12 
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other words, the union was adding its own economic strength 
to that of the Switchmen's Union. 
In the case of American Brake Shoe Company vs. Frank 
Annunzio, Director of Labor, et a], 405 Ill. 44, claimants who 
did not cross the picket lines set up by members of a different 
union at the company in w~ich they worked were held dis-
qualified from unemployment benefits. In commenting upon 
the eligibility of the workers the court said: 
"It appears to us from the evidence of the sole wit-
ness from the Die Sinkers' Conference that the real 
reason for the die sinkers failing to report for work 
was that they did not care to be classified as 'scabs.' 
Peaceful picketing by employees to gain rights from 
employers is recognized as a legal activity, but picketing 
coupled with violence is not recognized as a legal ac-
tivity. In this case it appears that the die sinkers could 
have entered their place of employment without sus-
taining bodily harm, and since this court will not as-
sume that picketing normally will bring violence, there-
fore it appears to us that the die sinkers voluntarily 
remained away from their employment because they 
did not care to be classified as 'scabs' by fellow em-
ployees. Since the fear of such classification appeared 
to be the motivation for their failure to enter their 
place of employment, it logically follows that they 
were either participating in the labor dispute by failing 
to cross the picket line or voluntarily remaining away 
from their employment, either of which would dis-
qualify them from compensation benefits. The die 
sinkers were unemployed solely because in accordance 
with their union principles they did not choose to work 
in a plant where certain employees from another plant 
of their employer were conducting picketing." 
In the case of Local Union No. 222, Oil Workers Inter-
13 
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national Union, et al, vs. Robert L. Gordon, Director of Labor, 
et al (Illinois Supreme Court, May 18, 1950) 406 Ill. 145, 
the production and maintenance workers of Local No. 222 
whose place of employment was shut down when a picket line 
was set up by employees of another company who were mem-
bers of the same international union, the court, in holding the 
workers ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits 
because of the workers' observance of the picket line, said: 
"The stoppage in the case at bar resulted from a 
conference not between the Texas Company and the 
pickets, but between Local 222 and the Texas Com-
pany. There is no showing in the case at bar of any 
threat of violence . . . In the case of American Brake 
Shoe Company vs. Annunzio, 405 Ill. 44, we held that 
employees are ineligible for unemployment compensa-
tion where they elect not to cross the picket line estab-
lished by other employees from another plant of the 
same employer who are members of a different labor 
union. We held that they must be regarded as either 
participating in the labor dispute which caused the 
picketing or being voluntarily unemployed because 
they did not care to cross the picket line. We cannot see 
how the plaintiffs in this case can be any more entitled 
to benefits than the plaintiffs in the American Brake 
Shoe case because the substance of the termination ar-
rangements of the negotiations merely were that both 
the union and the employer understood that Local 
Union 222 would respect the picket line and, therefore, 
there would be a work stoppage." 
In the instant case, as hereinbefore pointed out, the union 
had on one or more occasions advised the company that its 
members would not cross the picket line and that consequently 
the workers on the second and third shifts should be notified 
14 
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~: 
of that situation; in other words, that they were not to report 
for work. Naturally, \Yith no workers reporting for work be-
cause of unavailability due to their refusal to cross the picket 
line, a work stoppage resulted. Had the men presented them-
selves as be~ng ready and \villing to work, the operations of 
the American Smelting and Refining Company would have 
continued at the normal pace. 
The Indiana Board of Review in Decision No. 48-LDR-6, 
4-18-49, quoted at C.C.H. paragraph 8163, holds that mem-
bers of one union who refuse to cross the picket line established 
by another union are ineligible for benefits because they are 
voluntarily unemployed and because their unemployment re-
sults from the individual act of each claimant in failing to cross 
the picket line. The decision holds that the refusal to cross the 
picket line is tantamount to an individual act of participation 
by each claimant in the labor dispute. 
The Oregon Appeals Referee, in case No. 46-RA-144, 
March 9, 1946, quoted at C.C.H. paragraph 8059, held that 
even though the claimant states that he is not a member of the 
striking union and is not involved in the strike, he expresses 
interest in the dispute and participation in the dispute which 
creates his unemployment by his refusal to cross the picket 
line which has been established by workers in the factory at 
which he was last employed. 
The case of Carl W. Franke vs. Unemployment Compen-
sation Board of Review, 166 Pa. Super. 251, 70 A. 2d 461 
(9950), involved bus drivers who were unemployed duting 
a strike of the maintenance workers at the garage where the 
15 
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buses were kept. The court, in holding the bus drivers ineligible 
for unemployment compensation benefits because their un-
employment was due to their unwillingness to make a reason-
able effort to cross the picket line of the maintenance workers, 
said: 
"A non-striking employee's refusal to cross a picket 
line would be a 'voluntary' suspension of work within 
the meaning of Section 402 (d) where the decision was 
his own. Phillips, Unemployment Compensation Case, 
163 Pa. Super. Court :74, 62 A. 2d 84." (Citing other 
cases). 
In the matter of Frank H. McGann vs. Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 379, 62 A. 
2d 87, the court held that if a claimant is prevented from peace-
fully pursuing his employment because of the militant atti-
tude of the picket line, because of incidents of violence, and 
because of threats of physical violence, his unemployment 
would be involuntary. However, the court said that a mere 
statement by a claimant that he refused to cross the picket 
line because of fear of bodily harm is not enough to demon-
strate that his unemployment was involuntary in a situation 
where there was not a single overt act of violence of any 
character, leading a reasonable person to believe that he would 
be in physical danger in the event he attempted to cross the 
picket lines. The strike and picket lines are not always ac-
companied by violence, intimidation, and physical restraint. 
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we may assume 
that picketing is carried on peacefully and within the limits 
permitted by law. The court held that there was substantial 
and competent evidence supporting the finding that claimants 
16 
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made no efforts to cross the picket lines, that they were not 
actually threatened, and that there was no attempted violence, 
and that therefore they were subject to disqualification for 
voluntary suspension of work resulting from an industrial 
dispute. 
In the case of Joseph D. Phillips vs. Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 374, 62 A. 2d 84, 
the court held that the claimant, a member of a machinists 
union, who refused to cross a picket line established by an 
office employees' union, was unemployed due to a voluntary 
suspension of work resulting from an industrial dispute. The 
claimant was not prevented from crossing the picket line, and 
his adherence to union principles dictated his decision not to 
cross it, and that he had made the strikers' cause his own by 
voluntarily suspending his work. 
In the case of Joseph P. Stillman et al vs. Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 161 Pa. Super. 569, 56 A. 2d 
380, the court cited with approval the findings of the Board. 
These findings are as follows: 
"8. After the members of the tool and die makers 
union established a picket line at the !vieadville plant, 
the other employees who were members of affiliated 
unions of the American Federation of Labor failed to 
report for work because of their unwillingness to cross 
the picket lines. The employer company was at all times 
ready and willing to continue operations and would 
have been able to do so to a very considerable extent for 
some time after the strike by the tool and die makers. 
No action was taken by the employer, nor was any 
authorized action taken on its behalf, to close the plant 
or to afford a basis for reasonable belief on the part 
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of any employees that the plant had been closed to 
them. The failure of the. employees to work was not 
in any measure due to the fact that they were prevented 
from working. There was no violence, nor were there 
any threats. of violence on the picket line. Their failure 
and refusal to '.':cr!< was due to (a) their; objectior1s, 
based upon principle, to crossing a picket line; and (b) 
their unwillingness to risk the consequences which 
might be imposed by their unions by reason of crossing 
the picket line." 
"9. The tool and die makers went out on strike at 
the Erie plant on or about November 8, 1945. The 
company was also ready, able, and willing to continue 
operations at this plant. The suspension at the Erie 
plant likewise resulted from the failure or refusal of 
the employees to report for work after the strike by 
the tool and die makers at that plant. Their failure to 
work was based upon their objections in principle or 
their apprehension with regard to crossing a picket 
line." 
See also Miller vs. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of 
Review, 152 Pa. Super. 315, 321, 31 A. 2d 740. 
In the matter of the appeals of employees of the Pacific 
Telephone & Telegraph Company, decided by the Washington 
Supreme Court (Case No. 30668), October 22, 1948, 31 Wash. 
659, 198 P 2d 675, the court said: 
"Originally, the picket lines were maintained only 
by members of the plant union. However, the other 
employees (the claimants herein) refused to go through 
the picket lines although their jobs were at all times 
available to them. There was no violence or forceful 
.effort made to . prevent the claimants from working, 
but these employees had heard of violence in the east; 
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had heard rumors that probably pictures would be taken 
of anybody trying to ent~r the buildings; or that they 
would be branded as 'scabs.' The telephone operators 
testified that they were kept from the job through fear; 
some because of their husbands' jobs; some because 
they were just a[raid to cross picket lines. Although in 
Spokane and Seattle only members of the plant union 
maintained the picket lines, in Tacoma toward the 
end of the strike some telephone operators also acted 
as pickets." 
In the case of Phillip Meyer et al vs. Industrial Commis-
sion of Missouri, et al, decided by the St. Louis Court of Ap-
peals, October 18, 1949, C.C.H. 1fo. 8151, machinists who 
were unemployed because of a strike by the moulders in the 
employer's iron working plant, who refused to cross picket 
lines set up by the striking moulders, were disqualified for 
unemployment compensation benefits where their refusal to 
cross the picket lines was voluntary in that in the absence of 
proof to the contrary it is to be presumed that the picket lines 
were maintained and conducted in an orderly manner and 
there was no threat of bodily harm. The court said: 
"It seems to stand without dispute that one who 
voluntarily refused to cross the picket line to go to his 
work is participating in the work stoppage. This is true 
regardless of the fact that he may not profit by the 
strike since by refusing to work he has added his 
strength to the cause of the strikers and placed them 
in a better bargaining position. 
"The question for determination here is whether 
or not the refusal to cross the picket line was voluntary 
in view of the conduct of the pickets and by reason of 
testimony of the witnesses that they were afraid to 
cross the line. Generally a voluntary act is an act of 
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one's own choice and the motives that cause the choice 
to be made do not enter into the question. Such a con-
ception of the word 'voluntary,' however, presupposes 
freedom to choose a course of action, and so in de-
termining whether or not the refusal to cross the line 
was a. voluntary ::trt, 've must decide whether there was 
any restra~nt that prevented the workers from doing so. 
Such restraint might be actual physical restraint, or it 
might be such conduct on the part of the pickets as to 
reasonably give rise to a fear of bodliy injury." 
The several state unemployment compensation laws are 
patterned upon the provisions of the British and Canadian acts. 
We cite two decisions of the Canadian Umpire dealing with 
unemployment compensation insurance and with the eligibility 
of workers who refused to cross picket lines. In Case No. 
CUB-287, decided September 10, 1947, and published in the 
Selected Decisions of Umpire, 1943~1948, the facts and holding 
were as follows: The claimant, a carpenter and member of 
a union, hereinafter· referred to as "Union A," lost his em-
ployment by reason of a stoppage of work which occurred as 
a result of a labor--dispute between the employer and the hod 
carriers employed on the project, who were members of a 
union to which the claimant did not belong and which will be 
referred to as "Union B." He made a claim for unemployment 
compensation benefits contending that he was not participat-
ing in, financing or directly interested in the labor dispute but 
that he, as a member of Union A, was obligated under penalty 
of a fine authorized by the constitution of the parent body to 
respect the picket line set up by Union B, which had the same 
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In Case No. CUB-320, decided February 5, 1948, and 
published in Selected Decisions of the Umpire, 1943-1948, by 
the Unemployment Insurance Commission of Canada, a claim-
ant, a union member, who stated that he was not available for 
work because of the existence of a strike at his last place of 
employment was not available on the day on which he made 
he made his claim for benefits, and that due to a continuation 
of the strike, he continued to be not available for work. 
In the instant case, while there was no statement on the 
part of the claimants that they were not available for work, 
the record shows that they were not available for the principal 
and usual work for which they were best fitted. 
This court in Members of the Iron Workers of Provo, 
Utah, (Employees of Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company) 
vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, et al, 139 P. 2d 208, in 
discussing the failure of claimants to report for work because 
of a picket line, cited with favor the case of Bodinson Manu-
facturing Company vs. California Employment Commission, 
supra, stating that: 
"The Supreme Court of California held that if the 
applicant was not physically prevented from working, 
but he merely exercised the choice of following union 
principles by not going through the picket line, he was 
not out of work involuntarily and he was not eligible 
for unemployment compensation." 
This court also referred to the case of In Re Persons Em-
ployed, etc., 7 Wash. 2d 580, 110 P. 2d 877, in which the 
court held that inasmuch as members of the union which did 
not call a strike agreed not to go through a picket line estab-
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lished by other unions, they were thereby participating in a 
labor dispute and that there was no need for determining 
whether or not the applicants were of the same "class" of 
workers as the strikers or whether they were employed in a 
separate unit of the company. 
In the instant case, we do not, of course, have a labor dis-
pute existing between the company and the picketing workers 
or the company employees; however, the same principle is 
involved. 
Insofar as the unions are concerned, ··in unity there is 
strength," and the overall aims of union negotiations are fur-
thered by a full and complete cooperation regarding the recog-
nition of pickets. Regardless of how laudable these union 
principles might be, they cannot be construed as controlling 
the matter of the eligibility of affected individuals for unem-
ployment compensation benefits. We find several court cases 
involving the question of whether or not the intent and the 
provisions of the act rather than rules established by unions 
or employers, or both, are controlling in determining who 
shall receive unemployment benefits. In Levinson vs. UCC 
Circuit Court, Jasper County, Missouri, No. 47785, decided 
December 14, 1942, the Missouri Court held that a claimant 
who was discharged for failure to join a union with which 
his employer had entered closed shop contract was eligible 
for unemploymentcompensation benefits. The court said: 
"It is the opinion of the court that an employee 
who is performing satisfactory work and who is dis-
charged or required to quit for refusal to join a union 
cannot be considered as having separated from his 
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work voluntarily without good cause or had been sepa-
rated from work for misconduct connected with work, 
and such employee is therefore eligible for benefits 
under the unemployment compensation law." 
In the case of Prince vs. Schick, Inc., Super. Ct., Fairfield 
County, Connecticut, No. 75665, August 27, 1948; C.C.H., 
U.I. Rep., Volume II, page 10, 583, it was held: 
.. In reality there is no connection between the contract 
obligation assumed by the defendant employer to dis-
charge any of his employees suspended or expelled by 
the union and the plaintiff's rights under the unemploy-
ment compensation act. Obviously, too, there is no 
identity or mutual dependency between plaintiff's ob-
ligations to his union as a member thereof and his 
right to the bounty of the state as conferred by the 
unemployment compensation act. Of course, too, the 
defendant employer and the union to which he be-
longed could not agree together to a course of action 
which would, in effect, enlarge the scope of the law 
insofar as the disqualification due to 'willful miscon-
duct' beyond that sanctioned by the legislative inten-
tion is concerned.'' · 
To hold that the rights of employees to unemployment 
compensation under the Utah Employment Security Act can 
be determined by a decision of the employer or a decision of 
the union, would raise serious constitutional questions. It is 
questionable whether it could be said that due process of law 
has been granted to an employee whose claim for benefits has 
been denied on grounds of union rule or employer rule. It is 
also questionable whether the Legislature or the Commission 
could so delegate the function of determining claimant's rights. 
To hold that an employer rule or a union rule or principle is 
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controlling, would be to constitute the employer or the union 
as sole judge of eligibility. In such a case it would be necessary 
to include in the findings of the representative the local union's 
constitution and by-laws as well as those of the parent organi-
zation, together with a detailed and comprehensive statement 
of the union rule or principles involved. 
Again, we reiterate that the right to unemployment com-
pensation benefits under the Utah Employment Security Act 
must not be confused with the right of the individual worker 
to fulfill his obligations to the union movement by voluntarily 
honoring picket lines and by otherwise participating in disputes. 
Benefits under the Employment Security Act were definitely 
not intended to be available to underwrite actions of either 
employers or unions in their exercise of economic pressure 
moves. 
II 
THE PETITIONERS LEFT WORK VOLUNTARILY 
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE. 
We feel that the question of the claimants' leaving work 
voluntarily has been properly answered in the argument under 
Point I. As was pointed out, they certainly voluntarily de-
prived the employer of their services unless it is determined 
that union rules and principles supersede the intent of the 
legislative act and that in following those union rules or 
principles the claimants were not exercising their own volition. 
The claimants were represented by their union, and the union, 
acting as agent for the claimants, had voted (prior to the estab-
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lishment of the picket line) to honor the picket lines estab-
lished by the Switchmen's Union of North America. 
III 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE CLAIMANTS WAS 
NOT DUE TO THE EMPLOYER'S FAULT. 
The contention of petitioners that the inability of petition-
ers to gain access to their place of work was attributable to 
their employer because the employer failed to take steps to 
remove what the management felt was a secondary boycott 
appears rather inconsistent in view of the union's own actions. 
Prior to the establishment of the picket line, the union Execu-
tive Board, being in full possession of all of the facts which 
were possessed by the company management, had voted to 
recognize the picket line. It must have been as obvious to the 
union on the 23rd day of June, when such action was formu-
lated by the union, as it was to the management of the company 
on the 28th day of June, that there was no dispute existing 
between the company and the members of the Switchmen's 
Union of North America. The union knew at least by June 
25 that there were not even any positions on the premises of the 
company which were being filled by railroad employees. 
If the company knew that the picketing constituted a 
secondary boycott within the definitions of the State of Utah, 
then the union officers also knew. Knowing this the union 
voted to recognize the picketing by the Switchmen's Union 
and in effect to lend its support to the demands of that union. 
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Certainly all that the company did, from a practical stand-
point, was to recognize the practical situation existing by reason 
of the union's announcement that its members would not cross 
the picket line. The unemployment of the claimants resulted 
directly from their decision to follow their union principles, 
and not from any action taken by the company. From the 
standpoint of the members, their decision was a sound one; 
from the standpoint of their being eligible to receive unem-
ployment compensation during the period they were so un-
employed, the soundness of their action in following union 
principles cannot be the controlling factor. 
We respectfully submit that the claimants, by reason of 
their voluntary action in withholding their services from their 
regular employer, the American Smelting & Refining Company, 
thereby made themselves unavailable for work within the 
meaning of the Act and are therefore ineligible for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits. When an individual's usual 
wages, working conditions, etc., have not changed as regards 
his regular and current employer, such employment cannot 
be deemed otherwise than suitable, and the individual worker 
must make himself available to the employer to perform re-
quired services. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREMANN, Special 
Assistant Attorney General 
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